This policy describes, accurately and verifiably against the app's actual source code, what data the Seixo app collects, who else has access to it, for how long, and how you can ask for it to be deleted.
Data controller: Bruno, individual developer of the Seixo app. Contact: seixo.app@proton.me.
In short
We never ask for a phone number, name, email or access to your contacts.
The server can never read your messages: they are encrypted on your phone before they leave it. The exceptions are a message someone reports (the person who received it chooses to show it), and what you write to our automatic demo account.
Almost everything the server keeps deletes itself: we say below when.
We use no third-party advertising, analytics or tracking.
What the server keeps
About your account:
A random identifier, created the first time you open the app. It is not linked to any data about you.
Your public identity key and temporary public keys (Signal Protocol), so other people can start encrypted conversations with you. Private keys never leave your phone.
The date you last used the app (the day only, never the time), so abandoned accounts can be deleted.
The list of people you have blocked, visible only to you.
A notification token for your phone and the generic text your phone chose to display (for example, “You have a new message.”). It never includes the content or the sender.
About your conversations:
Which conversations exist and who belongs to each and, for groups, who owns them. This is the minimum the server needs to know where to deliver each message.
Messages, always encrypted. For each one the server sees which conversation it belongs to, the exact time, its size and whether it should trigger a notification: never its content, unless someone reports that message (see "Reports").
Who sent it: in a one-to-one conversation, this is not kept in our database. But the server knows who you are at the moment you send, and the hosting logs record that your account sent something at that time, which, for as long as those logs and the message exist, makes it possible to tell who sent it. In a group, the server can see who sent each message for as long as that message exists, because recipients need to know which key to decrypt it with.
Group names and the names you give contacts never reach the server in readable form.
About the photos and files you send:
Each photo is encrypted on your phone with a key made for it alone, and stored as a file named after the message it belongs to. The key travels inside the encrypted message: the server never has it and cannot open the file.
Of the file, the server sees: its size (rounded up, so it does not reveal the photo's real size), when it was stored and when it was last downloaded. That last piece is close to a read receipt: it says roughly when the other person received the photo. We cannot prevent it, because the storage service writes it; it exists only as long as the file does.
In the database, who sent the file is not recorded. The storage service tries to keep it; we erase it before it is written. (The hosting logs, as for messages, record the upload.)
Before it leaves the phone, the photo is rebuilt without the location, the phone model, the date and the other data photos usually carry. The app checks the result and refuses to send if any of it survived.
A file (a PDF, a Word or an Excel document, up to 10 MB) is encrypted and stored the same way. The file's name and type travel only inside the encrypted message: the server sees only the rounded size, as with a photo.
A location you send (paperclip, “Send my location”) travels only inside the encrypted message, once, when you choose to send it. The server never sees it. The app does not follow where you go and never reads your location in the background.
A file is not cleaned. Unlike a photo, the app cannot rebuild it, and a document can carry hidden the name of whoever wrote it, the computer's name, dates, earlier versions, comments or photos with their location. All of it travels encrypted and only the recipient can read it, but it travels. The app warns about this before every send.
Only if you create a backup:
An address and password derived from your 12 recovery words, so you can get back into the same account on another phone. The address ends in @seixo.invalid: it is not a real email, cannot receive mail and reveals nothing about you. The password is stored in irreversible form.
The backup file does not stay with us. It lives wherever you put it, and only opens with your 12 words, which we never receive.
IP addresses
Like any internet service, the server sees the IP address you connect from. It appears in two places, and we can only act on one of them.
In our database, where we can act:
The authentication service records the IP and device type for each session. We erase both fields every minute.
The authentication audit log is deleted after one hour.
In the hosting logs, where we cannot. Before a request reaches our code, the provider's entry layer records it. That record keeps:
the IP address;
the approximate country, city and postal code you connect from;
your internet provider;
a technical fingerprint of the device: the way your phone negotiates the encrypted connection, which is not an identifier of you, but does tell devices apart;
what was requested, for example that the account sent a message or which conversation it fetched messages from, but never the content, which is encrypted;
and, on most requests, the id of the account that made it.
We do not write that log and cannot touch it. It is kept by the hosting provider, under its own rules, which we do not control. We spell it out because, while it exists, a link between an account, a place and its activity exists at the hosting layer, exactly the information the rest of this policy goes out of its way not to create.
The app does not hide your IP. If that matters to you, use a VPN or Tor.
See what the host sees. In Settings, “What the server knows”, a button shows you the IP address your request reaches the server with at that moment. The answer comes from a function of ours that only hands back the address that arrived with the request: it stores nothing, logs nothing and asks no outside service where your IP is. The country, city and provider stay in the hosting provider's entry layer and never reach that function, so the button does not show them. It only runs when you press the button. The request itself goes into the hosting logs, like any other.
Notices. When it opens, the app asks the server whether there is a notice to show at the top of the conversation list. That request goes without your account's identification: the list is public and the same for everyone, and the hosting logs keep only the IP, not the account. Whether you saw, dismissed or opened a notice is kept only on your phone. We have no statistics about it.
Phone permissions
Camera: to scan a contact's QR code and to take photos you choose to send. A QR code is read on the phone and never sent or stored; a photo only leaves if you send it, encrypted.
Photos: no access to your library. When you choose a photo to send, the iPhone itself shows you your library and hands the app only the one you picked.
Files: no access to your files. When you choose one to send, the iPhone itself shows you your files and hands the app only the one you picked.
Location: only “while using the app”, and only when you choose to send your location to a conversation. It is read once, at that moment, and travels encrypted. Never in the background.
Microphone: only to record voice messages, when you press the button. Recordings are encrypted on the phone before they leave it.
Face ID: only to unlock the app, if you turn the lock on. It is handled by the phone's own system; nothing leaves the device.
Notifications: so you know a message has arrived.
What we do not collect
Phone number, name, real email (unless you write to us for support), your phone's contact list, location (the one you send in a conversation travels encrypted and we cannot read it), photos or advertising identifiers. We use no analytics, tracking or advertising SDKs.
How long we keep data
Messages: deleted from the server when the timer you chose runs out (between 30 seconds and 1 week, for the conversation or for a single message), even if nobody opens the app.
Voice messages: on the server for at most 24 hours, or less if the timer is shorter. Anyone who does not open the app within that window will not receive them.
Photos and files: on the server for at most 24 hours, or less if the timer is shorter, and deleted about a minute after the message they belong to. Anyone who does not open the app within that window will not receive them. On the recipient's phone they last as long as the conversation's timer says. A file can be saved or opened in another app by whoever receives it, and from then on it no longer depends on the timer.
Conversations: a conversation that never had a single message is deleted after 7 days. A conversation that has been used stays on the server for as long as its members' accounts exist (even after every message has expired), so that it does not disappear merely for having been quiet.
Temporary keys never used: 30 days.
Accounts: deleted after 6 months without opening the app, with everything that belongs to them. A backup of that account stops working.
Block list, notification token and backup credentials: for as long as the account exists.
Reports: 90 days. The mark of a suspended or expelled account: for as long as the account exists.
IP addresses: see the section above.
Who else has access to your data
The people in the conversation: only they can decrypt the content, on their own phones.
Supabase Inc., which hosts the database, the server and the encrypted photo and file uploads in the European Union (Paris). It has access to the data described above and to the encrypted content, which it cannot read, as well as to the content of reported messages. It is a United States company: the servers are in Europe, but the company operating them is subject to US law, and a legal demand made there can reach it. What would be there to hand over is exactly what this policy describes: encrypted text nobody outside the conversation can open, and minimal metadata that deletes itself within the periods given above.
Expo (650 Industries, Inc.) and Apple, which relay notifications to your phone. They receive the token and the generic notification text: never the content or the sender.
Proton AG, only if you write to us at seixo.app@proton.me.
Resend (Resend, Inc.), which sends the developer the alert email for each report. That email only says a report arrived, how many people have reported the account and whether it is suspended: never the reported text or any identifiers.
No one else. We do not sell, rent or share data with advertisers, social networks or any other third parties.
Reports
You can report a message or a person. It is the only way message content ever reaches the server in readable form (apart from what is written to the demo account, below), and it happens only because the person who received it chooses to show it.
A report keeps: who reported, the reported account, the conversation, and the reported message: its text, or the photo or voice message itself, which the reporter chooses to send. For a reported file, only its name goes: the file itself is not sent. For a reported location, the location does not go. In a one-to-one conversation this also reveals who sent that message, which the server does not normally keep.
Who sees it: only the developer, on a page reached through the link in the alert email. The email itself only says a report arrived: never the content or identifiers. A reported photo or voice message is kept in a private area of the server, and the page shows it only through a link that expires in 10 minutes.
For how long: the report is deleted 90 days after it is made.
What can happen to the reported account: if three different people report it, it is suspended automatically until reviewed. If the report is confirmed, the account is expelled. A suspended or expelled account stays marked on the server for as long as it exists, and it is the only one that can see that mark.
Demo account
There is an automatic demo account so the app can be tried on a single phone: it is used mainly by the App Store review team. Since version 1.14 the app offers it, in a card on the conversation list, to anyone who has no conversation yet: you only write to it if you choose to try it.
It is ours, and the server is its phone. So, unlike any other conversation, what you write to the demo account is decrypted by our server: it is the other end of the conversation. It reads each message only to reply, with sample messages that are always the same (one of them with offensive language, to show the filter), and it does not keep or log what it read.
What it keeps: the account's own keys and, for each person who writes to it, their ID, the encrypted session with them, whether they have received the sample messages and how many replies they got that day.
No other conversation goes through this code.
Your rights
Delete your account and all data: at any time, under Settings → “Delete account and all data”. This deletes your identity, keys, conversation memberships, block list, notification token and backup credentials from the server, and clears the data on your phone. Messages you already sent remain encrypted until their timer deletes them, and any backup you saved stops working.
Access, correct or request a copy of your data: write to seixo.app@proton.me. Since we do not know who you are, we may ask for the ID shown in the app to find your data.
If you are in the European Union, these correspond to the rights of access, rectification, erasure and portability under the GDPR.
Security
Messages are end-to-end encrypted with the Signal Protocol (PQXDH and Double Ratchet), using the official libsignal library. Your keys are stored encrypted on your phone, protected by the Keychain (iOS) or Keystore (Android), and temporary session keys are renewed every 2 days. This is not an absolute guarantee: no app can protect you if your own phone is compromised, or if someone photographs the screen with another device.
Children
The app is for adults 18 and over only, as the terms of use say. We do not knowingly request data from minors. We do not have an age verification mechanism.
Changes to this policy
If this policy changes significantly, it will be reflected on this page with a revised update date.